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against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdiction."
Significantly, among the factors listed that might justify permitting such collateral attack is "the fact that the determination
as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of law rather than
of fact.

23

In conclusion, it may be said that the court's suggestion
that all states adopt the rule laid down in its decision seems
neither sound nor likely to be accepted. Should the court's
decree be entitled to full faith and credit, one more step in the
encouragement of migratory divorces would be taken. If it is
valid in New York but not entitled to full faith and credit
elsewhere, an unfortunate instability in the status of the parties
as they move from state to state has been made possible.
Maynard E. Cush

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF LOUISIANA

ACTION STATUTE-SUITS ON OUT-OF-STATE

DIRECT

CONTRACTS

CONTAINING No-ACTION CLAUSES

Plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, brought a direct action against
defendant insurer, a British corporation, to recover damages for
injuries resulting from the use in Louisiana of a product manufactured by the insured, a Delaware corporation. Suit was
removed to the federal district court on the ground of diversity.
The contract of insurance was issued in Massachusetts and delivered there and to a subsidiary corporation in Illinois. It contained a provision, valid and enforceable in Massachusetts and
Illinois, prohibiting actions against the insurer until the amount
of the insured's obligation to pay had been determined either
by judgment against the insured or by written agreement. As a
condition to doing business in Louisiana, the defendant insurer
had consented to be sued' under the Louisiana direct action
23. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). The date of the Restatement
of course indicates that the American Law Institute did not have in mind
the problems of divorce jurisdiction that have recently arisen. The 1948

supplement to the Restatement does not alter the section quoted. However,
the original comment (b) of this section states: "[Ihf a suit for divorce is

brought in the court of a justice of the peace, which has no jurisdiction
to grant a divorce, and judgment is given granting the divorce, the judgment is void and subject to collateral attack even though the defendant ap-

peared in the action and the question of the jurisdiction of the court to
grant a divorce was litigated and determined adversely to the defendant."

1. Consent is required under La. Acts 1950, No. 542, p. 986, now LA. R.S.
22:983E (1950): "No certificate of authority to do business in Louisiana shall
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statute, R.S. 22:655.2 In the United States district court suit was
dismissed and the Louisiana direct action provisions were held
to be unconstitutional when applied to an out-of-state contract
containing a "no-action" clause. 3 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. On appeal, held, reversed. The legitimate
interest of Louisiana in the welfare of persons injured within
the state justified the application of its own law and the refusal
to enforce the provisions of the out-of-state contract. Neither the
due process nor the full faith and credit clause is violated by
the Louisiana direct action provisions. Watson v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corp., 75 Sup. Ct. 166 (1954).
From its beginning in act 55 of 1930, the constitutionality of
the Louisiana direct action statute has been the subject of considerable litigation in the lower federal courts. 4 The 1930 act
was generally held to be procedural rather than substantive and
its constitutionality upheld on this basis even when applied to
out-of-state contracts. 5 Shortly after Louisiana passed its Insurance Code, 6 in which act 55 of 1930 was re-enacted as section
14:45, it was held in Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co.7
that the legislature did not intend the direct action provisions
be issued to a foreign or alien liability insurer until such insurer shall
consent to being sued by the injured person or his or her heirs in a direct
action as provided in Section 655 of this Title, whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or
not, and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such
direct action, provided that the accident or injury occurred within the
State of Louisiana. The said foreign or alien insurer shall deliver to the
Secretary of State as a condition precedent to the issuance of such authority, an instrument evidencing such consent."
2. The statute provides in part: ". . . The injured person or his or
her heirs, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the
insurer within the terms and limits of the policy . . . and said action may
be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the
insurer jointly and in solido. This right of direct action shall exist whether
the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the state of
Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within
the State of Louisiana."
3. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 107 F. Supp. 494
(WD. La. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1953).
4. For a detailed discussion of the decisions which have considered the
constitutionality of the statute, see Comment, Direct Actions-Insurance
Contracts, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 495 (1953).
5. Rogers v. American Employers Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. La.
1945); Hudson v. Georgia Casualty Co., 57 F.2d 757 (W.D. La. 1932); Robbins
v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1936). See also Richburg v. Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co., 74 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. La. 1947). But see Wheat v. White,
38 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1941).
6. La. Acts 1948, No. 195, Vol. I, p. 508.
7, 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. La. 1950).

NOTES

1955]

to apply to out-of-state contracts. In dictum in that case the

court also stated that the Louisiana act could not constitutionally
apply to such contracts if they contained "no-action" clauses
valid under the law of the place of contract. By act 541 of 19508
the legislature specifically provided that the direct action provisions should apply even where out-of-state contracts were
involved, so long as the accident or injury occurred in Louisiana.
In addition, all insurance companies were required by act 542 of
19509 to consent to be sued under the direct action statute as a
condition to doing business in this state. In Bouis v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.' the federal district court gave act 541 of
1950 retroactive effect and enforced the direct action provisions
against an out-of-state insurance contract containing a "noaction" clause. The decision was based on a finding that the
statutes were procedural or remedial and not substantive. However, in a later decision by the same court, Bayard v. Traders and
General Ins. Co.," the statute was held to be substantive. Its
attempted application to an out-of-state contract was held to be
unconstitutional. 12 Since that case, with the exception of Buxton
v. Midwestern Ins. Co.,'

3

the federal courts have consistently

4
followed the Bayard decision.'
In the instant case, the first time the United States Supreme
Court has considered the constitutionality of the Louisiana direct
action statute, the defendant contended that it violated the equal
protection, contract, due process and full faith and credit clauses
of the Federal Constitution. The Court dismissed the equal
protection and contract clause arguments with very brief comment.' 5 Because the contract was made outside of Louisiana
and the direct action provisions clearly altered the obligations
8. Amending LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950).
9. See note 1 supra.
10. 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. La. 1950).
11. 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951).
12. The court relied on the decision in Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
13. 102 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. La. 1952). The court relied upon the consent
to be sued given by the defendant in compliance with LA. R.S. 22:983E (1950).
14. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Eunice Rice Milling Co., 198 F.2d
613 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 876 (1952); Fisher v. Home Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952); Mayo v. Zurich General Accident
& Liability Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. La. 1952); Bish v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corp., 102 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1952).

15. The Court found the equal protection argument "wholly void of
merit," since the statute's provisions apply equally to all domestic and for-

eign insurers. As to the contended impairment of contract, the Court simply
stated that the direct action provisions became effective before the contract
was made.
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of the defendant, so that the statute would seem to some extent
to have extra-territorial effect, the Court considered the due
process contention in more detail. After stating that in the
decisions relied on by defendant 16 it had been carefully pointed
out that a situation might arise in which the interest of a state
was so important as to justify non-enforcement of an out-of-state
contract, the court found the interest of Louisiana 17 in taking
care of persons injured within the state to be of this type, and
that Louisiana had a legitimate concern in the local activities
in connection with the policy. It was held that there was no
denial of due process in the refusal of Louisiana to enforce the
"no-action" clause of defendant's contract. Relying largely on
the same reasoning, the court held that there was no violation of
the full faith and credit clause in Louisiana's refusal to apply
the law of the place of contract, under which the no-action
clause was valid and enforceable. The court felt that the interest
of Louisiana was not outweighed by the interest of the state in
which the contract was made; therefore Louisiana was free to
enforce its own laws and policies. The Court found it unnecessary to consider the contention of defendant that the requirement of consent to be sued as a condition of doing business
in Louisiana forced defendant to surrender its constitutional
rights, 8 because as the court stated: "Louisiana has a constitutional right to subject foreign liability insurance companies to
the direct action provision of its laws whether they consent or
not." 1 9

Since its enactment the Louisiana direct action statute has
been subjected to almost every conceivable attack on its constitutionality. The lower federal courts, in sustaining some of these
attacks, had considerably limited the application of the statute.
16. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
17. This interest was described as that of safeguarding the rights of and
caring for persons injured in this state, who might become destitute, and
needing treatment, would call upon the public for help. The Court stated
that Louisiana has "manifested its natural interest by providing remedies
for recovery of damages." Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,
75 Sup. Ct. 166, 170 (1954).
18. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, stated that the major-

ity's reasoning in terms of the constitutional issues involved was unnecessary. The concurring opinion was based solely on the ground that Louisiana,
having the power to "exclude the insurance company from coming into the
state to do business," could constitutionally require the company to consent
to suit under the direct action provisions, the requirement being neither un-

reasonable nor arbitrary and being "strictly related to the protection of
serious interests of its own citizens." 75 Sup. Ct. 166, 171 (1954).
19. Id. at 170.
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NOTES

In the instant decision the Supreme' Court considered and rejected the arguments which, in the past, have been successful
in preventing its use. The decision should at long last put an
end to recurring litigation over the constitutionality of the
statute.20
Sidney B. Galloway

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-FLUORIDATION

OF WATER SUPPLY BY CITY
The Shreveport City Council adopted a resolution authorizing the fluoridation of the city water supply as a means of
combating tooth decay in children. The plaintiffs, as residents,
citizens, taxpayers, and purchasers of water from the city, sought
to enjoin the fluoridation, contending (1) that the contemplated
action was not authorized by the city's charter, and (2). that
even if authorized by the charter, the measure was nevertheless repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. The trial court issued the injunction, stating that the measure was strictly within the realm
of private dental hygiene and bore no reasonable relation to the
public health. On appeal, held, reversed. The city's fluoridation
of its water supply did bear a reasonable relation to the general
health and welfare of the community, was therefore authorized
by the city's charter, and violated neither the due process nor
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chapman
v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So.2d 142 (1954).
Concerning the constitutionality of state legislation enacted
for the public health and welfare, the Supreme Court of the
United States has stated: "Even if the wisdom of the policy
be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment."' In accordance with this
view, the Court has upheld a state statute providing for the
sterilization of idiots to prevent an increase in the number of
20. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 75 Sup. Ct. 151 (1954),
decided the same day as the Watson case, also settled an issue concerning
the Louisiana direct action statute which has often been involved in litigation. Federal jurisdiction was upheld on the ground that the "matter in con-

troversy . . . is between: (1) Citizens of different States" (28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1952) ) whenever an out-of-state insurer is sued directly (without joinder
of the insured) by a Louisiana citizen, regardless
insured wrongdoer is also a Louisiana citizen.

of the fact

1. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).

that the

